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Quantum Data Hiding
David P. DiVincenzo, Debbie W. Leung and Barbara M. Terhal
Abstract—We expand on our work on Quantum Data Hid-
ing [1] – hiding classical data among parties who are re-
stricted to performing only local quantum operations and
classical communication (LOCC). We review our scheme
that hides one bit between two parties using Bell states,
and we derive upper and lower bounds on the secrecy of
the hiding scheme. We provide an explicit bound showing
that multiple bits can be hidden bitwise with our scheme.
We give a preparation of the hiding states as an efficient
quantum computation that uses at most one ebit of entan-
glement. A candidate data hiding scheme that does not use
entanglement is presented. We show how our scheme for
quantum data hiding can be used in a conditionally secure
quantum bit commitment scheme.
Keywords—Quantum Information Theory, Secret Sharing,
Quantum Entanglement
I. Introduction
It is well known that composite quantum systems can
exhibit a variety of nonlocal properties. When two sys-
tems are entangled, as when two spins are described by the
singlet state 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), local measurements on the
two particles separately can exhibit statistics unexplain-
able by local hidden variable theories, such as a violation of
Bell’s inequalities [2]. An information-theoretic or compu-
tational expression of this feature is that entangled states
can function as nontrivial resources in quantum commu-
nication protocols [3], for example reducing the amount
of classical communication needed to perform certain dis-
tributed computations.
It has been found that even states without quantum en-
tanglement can exhibit properties of nonlocality that are
not present in purely classical systems. The first explo-
rations in this direction were carried out by Peres and
Wootters [4], who studied the measurements that could
optimally distinguish three nonorthogonal quantum states
of which two parties, Alice and Bob, both possess a single
copy. They found that any measurement that can be per-
formed using a sequence of local operations supplemented
by classical communication between the parties (denoted
as LOCC) is not able to retrieve as much information as a
global measurement carried out on the joint system. Thus,
even though no entanglement is present in this system, the
states exhibit nonlocality with respect to their distinguisha-
bility. In Ref. [5], where the term ‘quantum nonlocality
without entanglement’ was coined, a similar phenomenon
was exhibited: it is impossible to use LOCC to perfectly
distinguish nine orthogonal bipartite product states, which
are perfectly distinguishable when nonlocal actions are al-
lowed.
The results that we have presented in Ref. [1], and on
which we expand in the present paper, can be viewed as the
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strongest possible separation between the power of LOCC
versus global operations for the task of distinguishing quan-
tum states. We use the nonlocality of our quantum states
to establish a protocol of quantum data hiding: a piece of
classical data is hidden from two parties, who each share
a part of the data and are allowed to communicate classi-
cally. Such a scheme is nontrivial in several respects. First,
it is impossible in a purely classical world. Second, it is
impossible if the state shared by the two parties is a pure
quantum state. This observation follows from the result by
Walgate et al. [6] which shows that any two orthogonal bi-
partite pure quantum states can be perfectly distinguished
by LOCC. Third, the scheme is extremely secure; it is pos-
sible to make the amount of information obtainable by the
parties arbitrarily small; the number of qubits needed is
only logarithmic in the information bound.
The quantum data hiding scheme is secure if the parties
Alice and Bob cannot communicate quantum states and
do not share prior quantum entanglement. In what kind of
situations can these conditions be met, and is our scheme
of interest? One can imagine a situation in which a third
party (the boss) has a piece of data on which she would like
Alice and Bob (some employees) to act by LOCC without
the sensitive data being revealed to them. We have to as-
sume that the boss controls (1) the channel which connects
the two parties and (2) the labs in which the employees
operate, so that the boss can use dephasing to prevent the
quantum communication and to sweep those labs clean of
any entanglement prior to operation. Our scheme is such
that at some later stage, the boss can provide the employ-
ees with entanglement to enable them to determine the se-
cret with certainty. This feature is used for a conditionally
secure bit commitment scheme.
An additional advantage of our scheme, besides its
information-theoretic security, is that it can be imple-
mented efficiently; the number of computation steps re-
quired, both classical and quantum, grows no faster than a
polynomial of the input size. We find an efficient algorithm
to prepare the data hiding states which also minimizes the
use of quantum entanglement. The algorithm hinges on a
surprising connection between an operation known as the
Full Twirl [7] and a Twirl over the Clifford group [8]. The
Full Twirl is an important operation in the study of entan-
glement while the Clifford group is an important discrete
group in the theory of quantum error correction.
An original goal in our investigations was to establish a
data hiding scheme in which a bit could be hidden from
LOCC observers, and the data hiding states are unentan-
gled; this would have formed an extremely strong example
of ‘nonlocality without entanglement’. Separable (unen-
tangled) hiding states are interesting also because the se-
curity for hiding a single bit implies directly that hiding
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independently distributed multiple bits is also secure. The
quantum data hiding protocol using Bell states does not en-
tirely achieve this goal, since it still requires a small amount
of entanglement. We propose an alternative quantum data
hiding scheme that uses unentangled hiding states. We can
only rigorously analyze this scheme for small systems, but
on the basis of this analysis, we conjecture this scheme is
secure, in the same way as the scheme using Bell states.
Our paper is organized in the following way. In Section
II we review the general setup that is needed to analyze
the problem of distinguishing a pair of states by LOCC.
We derive a condition for any LOCC measurement that
attempts to distinguish a pair of states. A related condition
has also been discussed in Ref. [9]. In Sections III-V we
discuss various aspects of the security of our quantum data
hiding protocol: In Section III we discuss the scheme for
hiding a single bit. This scheme was first presented and
proved secure in Ref. [1]. Our analysis here goes into more
detail. Furthermore, in Section III-C we show that the
bound on the retrievable information is fairly tight – we
find a simple LOCC measurement that retrieves an amount
of information close to our proved bound. In Section IV, we
digress to show a general result, on how well a single bit can
be hidden in two arbitrary orthogonal bipartite states. We
obtain a lower bound on the retrievable information, which
shows in another way that our scheme has nearly optimal
hiding capability. In Section V we extend our protocol
to hide k > 1 bits. We are able to prove a good upper
bound on the information retrievable by LOCC, exploiting
the symmetry of our hiding states.
In Sections VI-IX, we present various schemes and dis-
cussions related to our quantum data hiding protocol: In
Section VI we present an efficient algorithm to prepare the
data hiding states which also minimizes the use of quan-
tum entanglement. We also prove the equivalence of the
Full Twirl and the Twirl over the Clifford group. In Sec-
tion VII, we discuss the reason that the security for hiding
a single bit implies the security for hiding independently
distributed multiple bits, and we describe an alternative
scheme for hiding bits that uses unentangled hiding states.
In Section VIII, we apply the quantum data hiding scheme
to construct a conditionally secure quantum bit commit-
ment protocol. We conclude our paper with some discus-
sion and open questions in Section IX.
The discussion up to Section III-B is a prerequisite
for all other Sections, which can then be read indepen-
dently. Throughout the paper, the tensor product of two
d-dimensional Hilbert spaces is denoted as Hd⊗Hd, and a
positive semidefinite matrix or operator A (with nonnega-
tive eigenvalues) is denoted as A ≥ 0.
II. General formalism for operations to learn
the secret
In quantum mechanics, a large class of state changes can
be described using the formalism of quantum operations. A
quantum operation is a completely positive map [10], [11]
on operators in a Hilbert space H. A convenient represen-
tation of a quantum operation is the operator-sum repre-
sentation [12], [10]:
S[ρ] =
∑
k
SkρS
†
k , (1)
where Sk are operators acting on H. We restrict our dis-
cussion to trace preserving quantum operations, for which∑
k S
†
kSk = I. The adjoint of the quantum operation S is
S†, whose action can be expressed as S†[ρ] = ∑k S†kρSk.
A state is represented by a density operator ρ ≥ 0 with
unit trace. A rank one density matrix, ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, is called
pure and is often represented as a Hilbert-space vector |ψ〉.
We will consider bipartite density matrices held by two
parties Alice and Bob. Peres and Horodecki et al. [13], [14]
have introduced a test for the separability of such bipartite
density operators, which we will use throughout this paper.
Their criterion is satisfied by a density matrix ρ when (1A⊗
TB)[ρ] ≥ 0, where TB stands for matrix transposition in
any chosen basis for Bob’s Hilbert space, and 1A is the
identity operation on Alice’s Hilbert space. We will say
that such a density matrix ρ is PPT, positive under partial
transposition.
Our goal is to hide classical data in bipartite mixed
states, meaning that Alice and Bob cannot learn the secret
if they do not share entanglement and can only perform
quantum operations in the LOCC class. An LOCC quan-
tum operation S has the Peres-Horodecki property, or P-H
property1: if ρ is PPT then (1A2,B2⊗SA1,B1)[ρ] is also PPT.
The subscripts in this expression emphasize that S may act
only on part of the bipartite Hilbert space A1,A2/B1,B2
on which ρ exists. (This extension to larger Hilbert space
parallels the definition of complete positivity of quantum
operations.) While the LOCC class is highly non-trivial to
characterize [15], the P-H property itself is much simpler
to check, and we will use this to derive necessary condi-
tions for LOCC operations. In our analysis we bound the
information Alice and Bob can obtain if they could use any
quantum operation satisfying the P-H property.
Since Alice and Bob are only interested in obtaining
classical data, we can restrict our attention to quantum
operations that yield classical outcomes only. These oper-
ations are called POVM (Positive Operator Valued Mea-
sure) measurements [16], [11]. A POVM measurement is
characterized by a set of positive operators Mi such that
the outcome i occurs with probability Tr(Miρ). The trace
preserving condition requires that
∑
iMi = I. The set
{Mi} is called a POVM, and eachMi a POVM element. A
POVM measurement on a bipartite input is illustrated in
Fig. 1(a).
Extending the discussion in Ref. [1], we now derive a nec-
essary condition for a POVM measurement to satisfy the
P-H property (and therefore, to be LOCC): each POVM
element is PPT.2
To show this, suppose Alice and Bob each create a max-
imally entangled state, |Ψmax〉 = 1√d
∑d−1
l=0 |l, l〉, in their
1Rains calls operations with this property p.p.t. superoperators; see
Section IX for further discussion.
2This is also sufficient, see Section IX.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, MARCH 2001 3
laboratories. The complete state held by Alice and Bob is
a product state and is thus PPT. Then, they apply the
POVM measurement on Hd ⊗ Hd to the two halves of
the two maximally entangled states, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
Suppose outcome i is obtained; then the residual state in
the two unmeasured halves is proportional to
ρf ∝
d−1∑
l,j,m,n=0
|l, j〉〈m,n| Tr [Mi |l, j〉〈m,n|]
=
d−1∑
l,j,m,n=0
〈l, j|MTi |m,n〉|l, j〉〈m,n| =MTi , (2)
where MTi is the matrix transpose of Mi. Thus, mea-
surement outcome i is produced together with the state
MTi /Tr(Mi) in the unmeasured halves of the maximally
entangled states. In order for the POVM to have the P-H
property, each of these states must be PPT; this establishes
that each MTi , and therefore each Mi, must be PPT.
In general, we consider all possible POVMs with PPT
elements. However, if we are only interested in the prob-
abilities of the outcomes and our data hiding states have
certain symmetries, then it suffices to consider a class of
POVMs reflecting those symmetries.
More specifically, suppose the secret b is hidden in the
global bipartite state ρb. Consider a POVM with PPT el-
ements Mi. The conditional probabilities of obtaining the
outcome i when the secret is b is given by pi|b = Tr(Miρb).
If T is a trace preserving quantum operation that is LOCC,
then T † is unital (T †[I] = I), and the operators T †[Mi]
satisfy
∑
i T †[Mi] = I and form another POVM with PPT
elements (since T † satisfies the P-H property). More-
over, if T fixes all ρb (i.e., T [ρb] = ρb), the new POVM
induces conditional probabilities p′i|b = Tr(T †[Mi]ρb) =
Tr(MiT [ρb]) = pi|b which are equal to those induced by
the original POVM. Hence it suffices to restrict ourselves
to POVMs with elements T †[Mi] ≥ 0 that are PPT and
sum up to I. Each quantum operation T that we will en-
counter reflects the symmetries in the data hiding states,
expressed by the fact that T fixes the states. The POVM-
elements T †[Mi] will possess symmetries that arise from
the symmetries of ρb, which can greatly reduce the number
of independent parameters needed to specify the POVM.
This will lead to a significant simplification in the security
analysis of our protocols.
III. Hiding a bit in mixtures of Bell states
In this section, we describe the basic scheme to hide a bit
in a mixture of Bell states. This is an in-depth discussion
which extends our earlier work [1]. We also detail the proof
of security, and discuss both the upper and lower bounds
of the information obtained about the secret.
A. The single-bit hiding scheme
The classical bit b = 0, 1 is hidden in the two hiding
states ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 . The bit should be reliably retrievable
by a quantum measurement; therefore, the states ρ
(n)
0 and
ρ
(n)
1 are required to be orthogonal, Tr(ρ
(n)
0 ρ
(n)
1 ) = 0. Each
ρ
(n)
b operates on H2n ⊗H2n and n is a security parameter.
Hence, Alice and Bob each has n qubits.
ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 are chosen to be
ρ
(n)
0 =
1
|En|
∑
k∈En
|wk〉〈wk| , (3)
and
ρ
(n)
1 =
1
|On|
∑
k∈On
|wk〉〈wk| . (4)
Here, |wk〉 denotes a tensor product of n Bell states labeled
by the 2n-bit string k, with the usual identification between
the four Bell states and two-bit strings [7]:
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)↔ 00 , 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)↔ 01 ,
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)↔ 10 , 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)↔ 11 . (5)
In Eqs. (3) and (4), En is the set of 2n-bit strings k such
that the number of 11 pairs, i.e. the number of singlet Bell
states, in k, denoted as N11(k), is even. On is the set of
bit strings k such that N11(k) is odd. The cardinalities of
En and On, |En| and |On|, satisfy the recurrence relations:
|En| = |En−1||E1|+ |On−1||O1| ,
|On| = |En−1||O1|+ |On−1||E1| , (6)
which imply
|En| − |On| =
(|En−1| − |On−1|) (|E1| − |O1|) . (7)
Since |E1| − |O1| = 3− 1 = 2, |En| − |On| = 2n and
|En| = (22n + 2n)/2 , |On| = (22n − 2n)/2 . (8)
If Alice and Bob can perform nonlocal measurements,
then they can simply distinguish ρ
(n)
0 from ρ
(n)
1 by mea-
suring along the Bell basis and counting the number of
singlets. For example, if they share n ebits, then Alice can
teleport her n qubits to Bob; he then measures the n pairs
along the Bell basis.
B. Upper bound on the attainable information
A general LOCCmeasurement to distinguish ρ
(n)
0,1 is spec-
ified by two PPT POVM elements M0,1, both acting on
H2n ⊗ H2n . For the optimal conditional probabilities, it
suffices to restrict to Bell diagonal POVM elements:
M0 =
∑
s αs|ws〉〈ws| , M1 =
∑
s βs|ws〉〈ws| . (9)
with αs, βs ≥ 0 and αs + βs = 1 for all s. To see this, let
TP˜n be the Partial Twirl [7] operation on n qubits
TP˜n [ρ] =
1
2
1
4n
∑
P∈P˜n
P⊗P ρP †⊗P † , (10)
where P˜n is the hermitian subset of the Pauli group Pn.
The elements of Pn are tensor products of the identity and
Pauli matrices σ
(j)
x , σ
(j)
y and σ
(j)
z acting on the j-th qubit,
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with additional ±1,±i factors. TP˜n = T
†
P˜n is in the LOCC
class; to implement TP˜n , Alice and Bob agree on the same
random P and apply P to their respective systems.
We now show that the effect of TP˜n is to remove the
off-diagonal elements in the Bell basis. On one qubit, TP˜1
transforms the Bell states according to
σc1c2 ⊗ σc1c2 |wk1k2〉 = (−1)k1·c2⊕k2·c1 |wk1k2〉 . (11)
In this notation, k1,2 are the two bits labeling the Bell state
as defined in Eq. (5), and c1,2 are the two bits labeling the
Pauli operators: I → σ00, σx → σ10, σz → σ01, σy →
σ11. When applying TP˜n to an arbitrary n-qubit state,
the phase factor in Eq. (11) assures that all off-diagonal
components in the density matrix are cancelled out when
we average over P˜n. Moreover, TP˜n fixes both ρ
(n)
b since
they are both Bell diagonal. Following the discussion at
the end of Section II, it suffices to consider T †P˜n [Mi] which
are Bell diagonal, as given by Eq. (9).
With the simplified form of M0 and M1, their partial
transposes can be evaluated directly. Using the fact that
|ws〉 = (σs ⊗ I)|w0〉, we find that
(1⊗ T )[M0]
= (1⊗ T )
[∑
s
αs(σs ⊗ I)|w0〉〈w0|(σs ⊗ I)
]
=
∑
s
αs(σs ⊗ I)(1⊗ T )[|w0〉〈w0|](σs ⊗ I)
=
∑
s
αs(σs ⊗ I)
(
1
2n
∑
k
(−1)N11(k)|wk〉〈wk|
)
(σs ⊗ I)
=
1
2n
∑
s,k
αs(−1)N11(k)|wk⊕s〉〈wk⊕s| . (12)
Hence, (1 ⊗ T )[M0] ≡ MPT0 is diagonal in the Bell basis,
and M0 is PPT if and only if
∀m 〈wm|MPT0 |wm〉 ≥ 0 . (13)
Since M1 = I −M0, M1 is PPT if and only if
∀m 〈wm|MPT0 |wm〉 ≤ 1 . (14)
These PPT conditions for m = 00 . . .0 require
0 ≤
∑
s
αs(−1)N11(s) ≤ 2n , (15)
or
0 ≤
∑
s∈En
αs −
∑
s∈On
αs ≤ 2n . (16)
We are now ready to use the expressions for p0|0 and p1|1:
p0|0=Trρ
(n)
0 M0 =
2
22n + 2n
∑
s∈En
αs ,
p1|1=
2
22n − 2n
∑
s∈On
βs =
2
22n − 2n
∑
s∈On
(1− αs) . (17)
We combine Eq. (16) with Eq. (17) to obtain
0 ≤ 1
2
(1 + 2−n)p0|0 +
1
2
(1− 2−n)(p1|1 − 1) ≤ 2−n , (18)
or rearranging terms,
1− 2−n
2
≤ 1 + 2
−n
2
p0|0 +
1− 2−n
2
p1|1 ≤ 1 + 2
−n
2
. (19)
Equation (19) puts linear constraints on (p0|0, p1|1) as de-
picted in Fig. 2, from which we find
|p0|0 + p1|1 − 1| ≤ 2
−(n−1)
1 + 2−n
≤ 2−(n−1) . (20)
Equation (20) implies that the measurement is not infor-
mative when n is large, since a coin flip without the state
ρ
(n)
b achieves p0|0 + p1|1 = 1.
We now outline how to quantify the amount of informa-
tion about the hidden bit that can be retrieved by Alice
and Bob. In general, Alice and Bob will have obtained, by
their measurements and operations, a multistate outcome
from which the final outcome is inferred. This corresponds
to the following process
B
M→ Y D→ Bˆ , (21)
where Y is a multistate random variable representing the
outcome of the general LOCC measurement M and D is
a decoding scheme to infer the bit b from Y . In princi-
ple, Y can contain more information about the hidden bit
than the final inferred outcome, since information can be
lost when decoding from a multistate random variable to
a binary one. In Appendix A, we show that any multi-
state random variable Y obtained in a scheme such as in
Eq. (21) under the condition of Eq. (20) conveys at most
H(B)/2n−1 bits of information on B. Here H(B) is the
Shannon information of the hidden bit. In other words,
I(B : Y ) ≤ H(B)/2n−1, and only a vanishing fraction of
the Shannon information of the hidden bit can be obtained.
We have given an elementary proof of Eq. (20). We now
give an alternative proof that is more easily generalized to
hide multiple bits. This proof uses the fact that ρ
(n)
b are
two extremal Werner states [17]:
ρ
(n)
0 =
1
2n(2n + 1)
(I + 2nHn) , (22)
ρ
(n)
1 =
1
2n(2n − 1)(I − 2
nHn) , (23)
where
Hn =
(
(1⊗ T )[|Φ+〉〈Φ+|])⊗n = 1
2
1
4n
∑
P∈P˜n
P ⊗ P , (24)
with P ranging over the hermitian subset P˜n of Pn. (Equa-
tion (24) will be proved in Section VI, see Eq. (73).)
Equations (22) and (23) can be proved by induction us-
ing Eq. (24) and the recursive expressions of ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 :
ρ
(n)
0 = qn ρ
(n−1)
1 ⊗ ρ(1)1 + (1− qn) ρ(n−1)0 ⊗ ρ(1)0 ,
ρ
(n)
1 = pn ρ
(n−1)
0 ⊗ ρ(1)1 + (1 − pn) ρ(n−1)1 ⊗ ρ(1)0 , (25)
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where
qn =
2n−1 − 1
2(2n + 1)
, pn =
2n−1 + 1
2(2n − 1) . (26)
It is known that I and Hn, and therefore ρ
(n)
b , are invariant
under the bilateral action U ⊗U for any unitary operation
U ∈ U(2n). Hence ρ(n)b are fixed by the Full Twirl opera-
tion:
TU(2n)[ρ] = 1
Vol(U)
∫
dU(U ⊗ U) ρ (U † ⊗ U †) . (27)
Like the partial twirl TP˜n , the Full Twirl is also self-adjoint
and in the LOCC class. Moreover, it is also known that the
effect of the Full Twirl is to turn any operator into a linear
combination of I and Hn [17]. Following the discussion in
Section II, when considering the conditional probabilities,
M0 and M1 can be taken to be
M0 = αI + β 2
nHn ,
M1 = (1− α)I − β 2nHn . (28)
Using
Tr(Hn) = 1 , Tr(H
2
n) = 1 , (29)
we find that
p0|0 = α+ β ,
p1|1 = (1− α) + β , (30)
and
p0|0 + p1|1 = 1 + 2β . (31)
A bound on the above expression can be found by extrem-
izing the value of β subject to the constraint that M0,1
in Eq. (28) are positive and PPT. From Refs. [18], [19]
we know that an operator aI + b2nHn has nonnegative
eigenvalues and is PPT if − a2n ≤ b ≤ a. Applying the
constraints to Eq. (28), we have
α− 1 ≤ β ≤ α , − α
2n
≤ β ≤ 1− α
2n
. (32)
Eliminating α from the above inequalities, we obtain |β| ≤
1
2n+1 and thus
|p0|0 + p1|1 − 1| ≤
2
2n + 1
, (33)
which is what we set out to prove.
C. A tight LOCC measurement scheme
We can give a lower bound on the attainable value of
p0|0+p1|1−1 by analyzing a particular LOCC measurement
scheme to distinguish ρ
(n)
0 from ρ
(n)
1 . In this scheme, Alice
and Bob try their best to distinguish whether each Bell
pair is a singlet state or not; then they take the parity of
all the results. The pairwise strategy is for Alice and Bob
to measure their qubits in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, and to infer
a singlet whenever the results disagree. For each pair, this
gives conditional probabilities
p
(1)
0|0 =
2
3
, p
(1)
1|1 = 1 . (34)
Using Eqs. (25) and (26), we can immediately write the
conditional probabilities of interest for the n-pair measure-
ment:
p
(n)
0|0 = (1− qn)
[
p
(1)
0|0 p
(n−1)
0|0 + p
(1)
1|0 p
(n−1)
1|0
]
+ qn
[
p
(1)
0|1 p
(n−1)
0|1 + p
(1)
1|1 p
(n−1)
1|1
]
,
p
(n)
1|1 = (1− pn)
[
p
(1)
0|0 p
(n−1)
1|1 + p
(1)
1|0 p
(n−1)
0|1
]
+ pn
[
p
(1)
0|1 p
(n−1)
1|0 + p
(1)
1|1 p
(n−1)
0|0
]
. (35)
It is easy to confirm that these expressions are satisfied by
p
(n)
0|0 =
1
2
2n + 2
2n + 1
,
p
(n)
1|1 =
1
2
2n
2n − 1 . (36)
This set of (p
(n)
0|0 , p
(n)
1|1 ) is plotted in Fig. 2 as point D. Note
that, for all n, they saturate the last inequality of Eq. (19)
and therefore our security result is tight for this value of
(p0|0, p1|1). Because of convexity, this gives a tight result
along the full line segment connecting point D with the
point A = (1, 0).
IV. General lower bound for hiding a single bit
Now we show that some information can always be ex-
tracted when orthogonal hiding states ρ0,1 are used. The
intuitive reason is that state tomography can be performed
by LOCC. Given a large number of copies of ρb, it is pos-
sible to identify ρb and thus b. Therefore, each copy must
carry a non-zero amount of information. The precise state-
ment is the following:
Theorem 1: For all pairs ρ0,1 on H2n ⊗ H2n such that
Tr(ρ0ρ1) = 0, there exists a two-outcome LOCC measure-
ment such that
p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 ≥
1√
16n − 1
√
1 + (p0|0 − p1|1)2 . (37)
It is immediate that
p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 ≥
1√
16n − 1 . (38)
These bounds are plotted for n = 1 and n = 2 in Fig. 3.
In Appendix B, we give a proof of this Theorem using a
Lagrange multiplier analysis, together with an alternative
simple proof for the weaker result Eq. (38). This bound
is not necessarily tight; the proof of Theorem 1 gives no
indication of whether or not the right hand side of Eq. (37)
could be larger. However, its approximate behavior, i.e.
p0|0+ p1|1− 1 ≥ 12O(n) is in accordance with our findings in
Section III.
V. Hiding Multiple Bits
In this section we will prove the security of hiding mul-
tiple bits bitwise with the scheme described in Section III.
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Let b = (b1, b2, · · · , bk) be a k-bit string to be hidden. The
hiding state is
ρ
(n)
b =
k⊗
l=1
ρ
(n)
bl
. (39)
Showing the security of the bitwise scheme is nontrivial.
First, one of the hiding states ρ
(n)
1 is entangled (see Sec-
tion VI), and the entanglement in part of the system may
help decode the partial secret in the rest of the system.
Second, joint measurement on all k tensor product compo-
nents may provide more information than a measurement
on each component separately. The security of multiple-bit
hiding is established using the symmetry of ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 ,
as captured by their Werner-state representation (Eqs. (22)
and (23)).
In the setup for hiding k bits, each POVM element Mi
has a k-bit index i and acts on H2nk ⊗H2nk . Since ρ(n)b is
invariant under (TU(2n))⊗k, Mi can be parametrized as
Mi =
k∑
p=0
∑
m:wh(m)=k−p
αip,mXm . (40)
whereXm =
⊗k
l=1H
ml
n and wh(m) is the Hamming weight
of the k-bit string m. Here ml denotes the lth bit of m,
H0n = I and H
1
n = Hn. The number of Hn in Xm is thus
wh(m). With this parametrization the trace preserving
condition
∑
iMi = I implies that∑
i α
i
k,m=0 = 1 , ∀m 6= 0
∑
i α
i
p,m = 0 . (41)
Next we consider the constraint (1 ⊗ T )[Mi] ≥ 0. The
partial transpose replaces the operator Hn by P+ =
(|Φ+〉〈Φ+|)⊗n. Therefore we have
(1⊗ T )[Mi] =
k∑
p=0
∑
m:wh(m)=k−p
Aip,mYm , (42)
where Ym is a tensor product of the orthogonal projectors
1−P+ and P+, such that P+ occurs where the k-bit string
m has a 1. Here the coefficients Aip,m are particular sums
of the coefficients αip,m of Eq. (40):
Aip,m =
∑
p≤l≤k
∑
n:wh(n)=k−l
∧i(n¯i∨mi)=1
αil,n . (43)
The Boolean-logic condition on n in the summation, ∧i(n¯i∨
mi) = 1, can be expressed in ordinary language by saying
that the string n must have 0s wherever the sting m has
0s. A necessary (and, in fact, sufficient) condition for the
positivity of Eq. (42) is that these coefficients Aip,m ≥ 0.
When p = k, this implies that
Aik,m=0 = α
i
k,0 ≥ 0 . (44)
Together with Eq. (41) we obtain for all i
0 ≤ αik,0 ≤ 1 . (45)
We will bound the coefficients αip,n for all i, p and n. These
upper and lower bounds,
Lp ≤ αip,n ≤ Up , (46)
will be obtained recursively as we decrease p from k. The
recurrence starts with Lk = 0 and Uk = 1, Eq. (45). Let
us assume that we can determine Lp for p < k. Then Up
directly follows, using the second equation in Eq. (41): we
have
αjp,n = −
∑
i6=j
αip,n ≤ −(2k − 1)Lp , (47)
or Up = −(2k−1)Lp for p < k. Then we need to determine
Lp, which can be done using the PPT condition. We can
express Aip,m ≥ 0 as
αip,m ≥ −
∑
p<l≤k
∑
n:wh(n)=k−l
∧i(n¯i∨mi)=1
αil,n
≥ −
∑
p<l≤k
Ul
(
k − p
l − p
)
. (48)
Or, for p < k
Lp = −
∑
p<l≤k
Ul
(
k − p
l − p
)
, (49)
so, in terms of Ll:
Lp = −1 + (2k − 1)
∑
p<l<k
Ll
(
k − p
l− p
)
. (50)
This recursion can be solved, giving
Lp = −
k−p∑
l=1
(1− 2k)l−1
l∑
j=1
(−1)j
(
l
j
)
jk−p , (51)
which can be rewritten in terms of the Sterling numbers of
the second type, {xy }, as
Lp = −
k−p∑
l=1
(2k − 1)l−1l!
{
k − p
l
}
. (52)
Let us consider the probabilities pi|b = Tr (Miρb). Using
the fact that TrHn = TrH
2
n = 1, it can be shown that for
m with Hamming weight k − p
Tr (Xmρb) =
(−1)b·m
2n(k−p)
. (53)
Thus
pi|b =
k∑
p=0
∑
m:wh(m)=k−p
αip,m
(−1)b·m
2n(k−p)
, (54)
or
pi|b = α
i
k,0 +
k−1∑
p=0
∑
m:wh(m)=k−p
αip,m
(−1)b·m
2n(k−p)
. (55)
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We bound the magnitude of the last term as
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
p=0
∑
m:wh(m)=k−p
αip,m
(−1)b·m
2n(k−p)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ∆ = (2k − 1)
k−1∑
p=0
(
k
k − p
) |Lp|
2n(k−p)
, (56)
so we bound the conditional probabilities
αik,0 −∆ ≤ pi|b ≤ αik,0 +∆ . (57)
∆ enters the bound for the mutual information obtainable
by Alice and Bob. Ideally we would like to use Eq. (57)
to bound the retrievable attainable mutual information as-
suming an arbitrary probability distribution for the hiding
states ρ
(n)
b , as we did in the case of hiding a single bit. We
do not know if the proof technique of Theorem 2 in Ap-
pendix A is applicable in the multiple-bit case, so we will
have recourse to another method which provides a bound
in the case of equal probabilities pb =
1
2k .
We first bound the total error probability
pe = 1−
∑
b
pb pb|b = 1−
1
2k
∑
b
pb|b . (58)
Using Eq. (57) we get
1− 1
2k
∑
b
(αbk,0 +∆) ≤ pe ≤ 1−
1
2k
∑
b
(αbk,0 −∆) , (59)
and, with Eq. (41), we obtain
1− 1
2k
−∆ ≤ pe ≤ 1− 1
2k
+∆ . (60)
With this bound on the error probability it is possible to
bound the mutual information between the k hidden bits b
and a multi-outcome measurement by Alice and Bob, simi-
larly to the single bit case, see Eq. (21). For a process such
as Eq. (21) where B and Bˆ are replaced by k bit random
variables B and Bˆ, it can be shown3 that the mutual in-
formation I(B : Y ) ≤ H(B) + log(1− pe). Using Eq. (60),
this implies that
I(B : Y ) ≤ 2
k
ln 2
∆ . (61)
Figure 4 shows an exact calculation of this bound as a
function of n and k. We can show that these bound curves
have a simple form in the region of interest by a further
examination of Eqs. (52) and (56). It is straightforward to
demonstrate that, if k ≫ 1, Eq. (52) is dominated by its
final term, so that we can approximate
Lp ≈ −(2k − 1)k−p−1(k − p)! . (62)
3This was proved by V. Castelli, October 2000.
With this we can write Eq. (56) as
∆ ≈
k∑
s=1
(
k
s
)
(2k − 1)s
2ns
s!
= k!
k−1∑
i=0
(
2k − 1
2n
)k−i
1
i!
. (63)
It is easy to show that if 2n−k ≫ k then the last term in
this sum dominates, so we obtain
∆ ≈ k2k−n , (64)
and Eq. (61) becomes
I(B : Y )
<∼ k2
2k−n
ln 2
. (65)
The curves shown in Fig. 4 are excellently approximated
by this expression.
This result shows that if we fix k, there always exists an
n large enough so that the information that Alice and Bob
can gain is arbitrarily small. Equation (65) says that, for
a given security parameter I(B : Y ) ≤ ǫ, n should grow, in
the large k limit, as
n(k)→ 2k + log k + log log e + log(1/ǫ) . (66)
It is interesting to note that the above bound is much
weaker than in the case when information is additive over
the different bits hidden, which would imply
n(k)→ log k + log(1/ǫ) . (67)
Sufficient conditions for information to be additive will be
discussed in Section VII-A.
VI. Preparation of the hiding states
We consider the question of how the hider can efficiently
produce the states ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 starting with minimal en-
tanglement between the two shares. The defining represen-
tation of the states, Eqs. (3) and (4), suggests a method
to create the hiding states by picking n Bell states with
the correct number of singlets (even or odd). This method
is computationally efficient, but uses a lot of quantum en-
tanglement between the shares, namely n ebits per hiding
state. The alternative representation of ρ
(n)
0 and ρ
(n)
1 as
Werner states, Eqs. (22) and (23), can be used to show
that they have 0 and 1 ebit of entanglement of forma-
tion respectively [18], [20]. We first describe an efficient
LOCC preparation for ρ
(n)
0 from the unentangled pure state
|0〉 = |0〉⊗n⊗ |0〉⊗n. By efficient we mean that the number
of quantum and classical computational steps scales as a
polynomial in n, the number of qubits in each share. Then,
using the recursive relations Eq. (25), and the preparation
for ρ
(n)
0 , we give a preparation for ρ
(n)
1 using exactly 1 ebit
for arbitrary n. Note that this is a tight construction in
terms of entanglement, since ρ
(n)
1 has an entanglement of
formation of 1 ebit.
SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, MARCH 2001 8
A. Preparing ρ
(n)
0
Recall from Section III that the Full Twirl
TU(2n)[ρ] = 1
Vol(U)
∫
dU(U ⊗ U) ρ (U † ⊗ U †) , (68)
has only two linearly independent invariants I and Hn, and
it transforms any state to a Werner state. Moreover, note
that
Tr(TU(2n)[ρ]Hn) = Tr(ρT †U(2n)[Hn]) = Tr(ρHn) . (69)
Hence, the Full Twirl transforms ρ to a Werner state with
the same overlap with Hn. From Eqs. (22) and (29),
Tr
(
ρ
(n)
0 Hn
)
= 12n ; this also equals Tr (|0〉〈0|Hn) using
Eq. (24). Hence,
ρ
(n)
0 = TU(2n) [|0〉〈0|] , (70)
and ρ
(n)
0 could be prepared by applying TU(2n) to |0〉.
The Full Twirl, interpreted as the application of a ran-
dom bilateral unitary, is not efficient to implement. Ap-
plying a unitary transformation selected at random is a
hard problem: almost all unitary transformations take an
exponential time in the number of qubits to accurately ap-
proximate [21]. In the following, we give an efficient im-
plementation of the Full Twirl, first by showing that it is
equivalent to randomizing over the Clifford group only, and
second by providing methods to select and implement a
random Clifford group element efficiently.
A.1 Clifford Twirl
The Clifford group C has appeared in quantum infor-
mation theory as an important group in the context of
quantum error correcting codes [22], [8]. The Clifford
group Cn ⊂ U(2n) is the normalizer of the Pauli group
Pn. The order of the Clifford group acting on n qubits is
|Cn| = 2n2+2n+3Πnj=1(4j − 1) [22].
It is useful to consider how each c ∈ Cn acts on Pn by
conjugation. As the conjugation map is reversible, Cn is
a subgroup of the permutation group acting on Pn. Each
c is specified by the 2n images of the generators of Pn
ai = cσ
(i)
x c† and bi = cσ
(i)
z c† for i = 1, · · · , n. There are
restrictions on these images, since conjugation preserves
the eigenvalues (and thus the trace), the commutation re-
lations, and the multiplicative structure of the Pauli group.
Because of eigenvalue preservation, conjugation preserves
the hermitian subset P˜n (introduced earlier, see Eq. (10)).
The images are 2n traceless hermitian Pauli operators satis-
fying the commutation relations ∀i, j [ai, aj ] = [bi, bj] = 0,
∀i 6= j [ai, bj] = 0 and {ai, bi} = 0. Each c ∈ Cn
can be explicitly constructed: first choose a1 6= I, then
choose a2 to commute with a1, and a2 /∈ {I, a1}, then
choose a3 to commute with a1, a2 and a3 /∈ {I, a1, a2, a1a2},
and so on until an is chosen. Each bi can be chosen
to anticommute with ai and commute with all other aj
and b1, · · · , bi−1. If (a1, · · · , an, b1, · · · , bn) is a valid set
of images corresponding to a Clifford group element c,
((−1)ǫ1a1, · · · , (−1)ǫnan, (−1)ǫn+1b1, · · · , (−1)ǫ2nbn) is an-
other valid set corresponding to
c (σǫ1z σ
ǫn+1
x ⊗ . . .⊗ σǫnz σǫ2nx ) , (71)
where each ǫi = 0, 1.
We define the “Clifford twirl” on H2n ⊗ H2n to be the
operation
TCn [ρ] =
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
(c⊗ c) ρ (c† ⊗ c†) . (72)
We now prove that TCn = TU(2n). We need to show that
these two quantum operations transform any state to the
same output. It suffices to show that (1) TCn = T †Cn , (2)TCn [I] = I, (3) TCn [Hn] = Hn, and (4) TCn transforms
any state to a linear combination of I and Hn. Conditions
(1)-(4) ensure that TCn transforms any state to a Werner
state with the correct overlap with Hn, i.e., Tr (Hnρ) =
Tr (HnTCn [ρ]) (cf. Eq. (69)). Conditions (1) and (2) are
obvious. Condition (3) can be proved by writing
Hn =
(
(1⊗ T )[|Φ+〉〈Φ+|])⊗n
=
1
4n
(I ⊗ I + σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy + σz ⊗ σz)⊗n
=
1
2
1
4n
∑
P∈P˜n
P ⊗ P . (73)
Since conjugation by each c ∈ Cn only permutes the terms
in this sum over P˜n, Hn is invariant under TCn . This es-
tablishes (3).
To show condition (4), we consider the action of TCn
on a basis for the density matrices. We choose the basis
P1⊗P2 ∈ P˜n⊗P˜n. We already know that TCn [I⊗I] = I⊗I.
Without loss of generality, P1 6= I. First consider P1 6= P2.
There exists a c˜ such that c˜P1c˜
† = σ(1)x and c˜P2c˜† = g =
σ
(2)
x or σ
(1)
z or I depending on whether [P1, P2] = 0 or
{P1, P2} = 0 or P2 = I. Then
TCn [P1 ⊗ P2] =
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
(cP1c
†)⊗ (cP2c†)
=
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
(cσ(1)x c
†)⊗ (cgc†) . (74)
For every c, there is another c′ (see Eq. (71)) such that
c′σ(1)x c′† = −cσ(1)x c† and c′gc′† = cgc†, hence the sum van-
ishes. Now consider P = P1 ⊗ P1.
TCn [P1 ⊗ P1] =
1
|Cn|
∑
c∈Cn
(cσ(1)x c
†)⊗ (cσ(1)x c†) . (75)
Following the discussion on specifying Clifford group ele-
ments, cσ
(1)
x c† ranges over all elements in P˜n−{I}. More-
over, each cσ
(1)
x c† occurs in the sum the same number of
times independent of c; this is the number of valid combi-
nations a2, · · · , an, b1, · · · , bn that complete the image set,
which is independent of c. Thus we obtain
P ⊗ P TCn→ 1|P˜n| − 1
∑
Q∈P˜n−{I}
Q⊗Q . (76)
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Comparing this with Eq. (73), we see that this is a linear
combination of I and Hn. This proves condition (4), and
thus TCn = TU(2n). Therefore TCn [|0〉〈0|] = ρ(n)0 .
A.2 Selecting and implementing a random element in the
Clifford group
To implement the Clifford twirl efficiently, we need to se-
lect and implement random elements in the Clifford group.
Our method is based on the circuit construction of any Clif-
ford group element in Ref. [8] by Gottesman. The essence
of his construction is as follows. We choose the following
generating set for the Clifford group Cn:
G = {hi,cnotjk, pm, p†n} , (77)
where h, cnot, and p respectively stand for the 1-qubit
Hadamard transform 1√
2
(
1 1
1−1
)
, the 2-qubit controlled-not,
and the 1-qubit phase gate
(
1 0
0 i
)
. Subscripts in Eq. (77)
denote the qubit(s) being acted on.
Note that the generating set is self-inverse and that it
has n2 + 2n elements. From Ref. [8], a circuit with no
more than 3n2 + 7n+O(1) gates from G can be explicitly
constructed for each element in Cn.
It remains to find a method to select any random ele-
ment in Cn with uniform probability. This cannot be done
simply by randomizing the building blocks of the Gottes-
man construction. Hence we use a random walk over Cn
to generate a random element, which can then be imple-
mented by the Gottesman construction. Even though |Cn|
is of order 2O(n
2), it can be proved that our random walk
converges in O(n8) steps to the uniform distribution over
the Clifford group elements.
The algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1. Classical random walk. Determine a random element
using a random walk algorithm: at every time step, with
probability 1/2, do nothing, and with probability 1/2
choose a random element in G. Proceed for O(n8) steps.
Let the resulting element be U . Classically compute the
images Uσ
(i)
x U † and Uσ
(i)
z U †, which can be done efficiently
following the Knill-Gottesman theorem [8].
2. Quantum circuit. Using the 2n images, build a quantum
circuit to implement U using the Gottesman construction
with 3n2 + 7n+O(1) generators.
Remarks: We separate the algorithm into classical and
quantum parts because there are O(n8) classical steps but
only O(n2) quantum gates. The ‘do nothing’ step with
probability 1/2 is based on a technicality in the proof and
may be skipped in an implementation, so that a random
generator is picked at every round.
We prove that the Markov random walk ‘mixes’ in O(n8)
steps. The proof [23] relies on the facts that (1) any ele-
ment of the Clifford group can be reached from any other
by applying O(n2) generators, i.e. the diameter d of the
(Cayley) graph of the group is O(n2), and (2) the random
walk uses a symmetric (self-invertible) set of generators
over a group. We use Corollary 1 in Ref. [24] to bound the
second largest eigenvalue λ2 of this Markov chain as
λ2 ≤ 1− η/d2 , (78)
where d is the diameter and η is the probability of the least
likely generator, which is η = 1n2+2n in our case. Therefore
λ2 ≤ 1−O(1/n6). Then, using Lemma 2 in Ref. [24], after
k steps of iteration the distance of the obtained distribution
p(k) from the uniform distribution u(c) = 1|C| is bounded
as ||p(k) − u||1 ≤
√|C|(1 − O(1/n6))k. Here, we use the
L1 norm between two distributions p(c) and q(c), i.e. ||p−
q||1 =
∑
c∈C |p(c)−q(c)|. If we set k = O(n8), this distance
can be bounded by a small constant.
B. Preparing ρ
(n)
1
The state ρ
(n)
1 can be created using one singlet state.
This is obvious when n = 1. For n ≥ 2, ρ(n)1 can be cre-
ated using the recurrence relation Eq. (25) by the following
recursive process:
• Flip a coin with bias pn for 0, and bias 1− pn for 1.
• If the outcome is 0, prepare ρ(n−1)0 ⊗ρ(1)1 . If the outcome
is 1, prepare ρ
(n−1)
1 ⊗ ρ(1)0 . When n − 1 ≥ 2, ρ(n−1)1 is
prepared recursively. Otherwise, ρ
(n−1)
1 is just the singlet.
Note that the procedure relies on the preparation of all
possible ρ
(n)
0 without entanglement. Note also that the
singlet ρ
(1)
1 is used exactly once in the procedure.
VII. Data hiding in separable states
We have considered hiding states with very little entan-
glement. In this section, we consider completely separable
hiding states. Such “separable hiding schemes” are inter-
esting for several reasons. First, given a separable scheme
to hide one bit, multiple bits can be hidden bitwise; if the
probability distributions of these bits are independent, then
the attainable information is additive (as will be proved
in Section VII-A). Second, the hiding states can be pre-
pared without entanglement. Third, from a more funda-
mental perspective, such separable hiding schemes exhibit
the intriguing phenomenon of quantum nonlocality with-
out entanglement [5] to the fullest extent. We have good
candidates for separable hiding states, but have not been
able to prove their security rigorously. First we present a
proof due to Wootters4 of the additivity of information in
a bitwise application of separable hiding schemes.
A. Additivity of information when states are separable
Suppose the bit b = 0, 1 can be hidden in the separable
states ρb=0,1, with bounded attainable mutual information,
I(B : Y ) ≤ δ. We call this the “single-bit protocol”. We
consider hiding two bits b1, b2 in the tensor-product state
ρb1⊗ρb2 . Consider I(B1B2 : Y12) where Y12 is the outcome
of any measurement on ρb1 ⊗ ρb2 which is LOCC between
Alice and Bob but can be jointly on ρb1 and ρb2 . By the
4Email correspondence from W. K. Wootters, January 1999.
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chain rule of mutual information [25], we have
I(B1B2 : Y12) = I(B1 : Y12) + I(B2 : Y12|B1) . (79)
We now show that, when b1 and b2 are independent (hav-
ing a product distribution p(b1)p(b2)), both I(B1 : Y12)
and I(B2 : Y12|B1) can be reinterpreted as the informa-
tion obtained about a bit hidden with the single-bit pro-
tocol and are bounded by δ. The term I(B1 : Y12) mea-
sures how much about b1 is learned from Y12, when b2 is
unknown. This is also the information about b1 learned
from ρb1 by the following LOCC procedure: First, ap-
pend an extra ρb2 , chosen according to the probability
distribution p(b2). Then, without using their knowledge
of b2, Alice and Bob measure Y12 on ρb1 ⊗ ρb2 . Thus
I(B1 : Y12) ≤ δ. It is crucial that ρb2 is separable and
can thus be prepared by LOCC. Similarly, I(B2 : Y12|B1)
is the information about b2 learned from ρb2 by append-
ing a known extra ρb1 (chosen with probability p(b1)) and
measuring Y12. Hence I(B2 : Y12|B1) ≤ δ. More gener-
ally, I(B1B2 · · ·Bk : Y ) ≤ kδ for any Y , implying that the
information is additive.
Note that this additive information bound for separable
hiding states is much stronger than that for entangled hid-
ing states (Section V). Note that there is an important
difference between hiding with separable states and the
problem of classical data transmission through a (noisy)
quantum channel. For the latter it is known that the ca-
pacity is nonadditive, in the sense that the receiver has to
perform joint measurements on the data to retrieve the full
Holevo information [26]. The difference is that to achieve
the Holevo information one encodes the classical data, so
that the prior distribution is not independent over the dif-
ferent states. In our information bound for bit hiding, the
different bits are assumed to have independent prior prob-
abilities.
B. An alternative hiding scheme
In this section, we discuss some interesting properties of
two orthogonal separable states inH2⊗H2, and a candidate
separable hiding scheme built from them. Consider the
following two bipartite states in H2 ⊗ H2, introduced in
Section VII of [5]:
τ0 =
1
2
[ |+〉〈+| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ |0〉〈0| ⊗ |+〉〈+| ] ,
τ1 =
1
2
[ |−〉〈−| ⊗ |−〉〈−|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1| ] , (80)
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). These separable states are or-
thogonal, but the results of Ref. [5] suggest that they are
not perfectly distinguishable by LOCC. We now strengthen
this result using the general framework for LOCC measure-
ments described in Section II.
Our goal as before is to bound p0|0 + p1|1 obtained by
any measurement with PPT POVM elements. Following
the discussion of Section II, we restrict to PPT POVM el-
ements M0,1, and use the symmetry of τ0,1 to simplify the
possible form of M0,1. It will suffice to consider POVM el-
ements T †[Mi], where T [ρ] = 14 (ρ+sρs+h2ρh2+sh2ρh2s)
with h2 = h⊗ h being the bitwise Hadamard transforma-
tion on both qubits, and s being the swap operation on
the two qubits. It is immediate that T is self-adjoint, and
that it fixes τ0,1. Unlike in Section II, T is not LOCC, but
it does preserve the PPT property of Mi, because sMis
is PPT (the swap just relabels the input bits). Moreover,
∀M , T [T [M ]] = T [M ]; therefore, we can restrict to POVM
elements M that are invariant under T . This symmetry is
most easily imposed in the Pauli decompositions of M0,1:
M0 = aPa + cPc + ePe + dPd ,
M1 = (1− a)Pa − cPc − ePe − dPd , (81)
where
Pa = I ⊗ I ,
Pc = σz ⊗ I + I ⊗ σz + σx ⊗ I + I ⊗ σx ,
Pd = σz ⊗ σz + σx ⊗ σx ,
Pe = σz ⊗ σx + σx ⊗ σz , (82)
are the only linearly independent invariants under T . Note
that M0,1 are automatically invariant under partial trans-
pose. Therefore, it only remains to impose conditions on
a, c, d, e to make 0 ≤M0 ≤ I:
0 ≤ a− 2d ≤ 1 , (83)
0 ≤ a− 2e ≤ 1 , (84)
0 ≤ α± β ≤ 1 . (85)
In Eqs. (83)-(85), the bounded quantities are eigenvalues
of M0, with α = a+ d+ e and β =
√
8c2 + (d− e)2.
To find p0|0 and p1|1, we express τ0,1 in their Pauli de-
compositions, using |0〉〈0| = 12 (I + σz), |1〉〈1| = 12 (I − σz),
and |±〉〈±| = 12 (I ± σx):
τ0 =
1
8
(2Pa + Pc + Pe) ,
τ1 =
1
8
(2Pa − Pc + Pd) . (86)
Using Eqs. (81) and (86), and the trace orthonormality of
the Pauli matrices (up to a multiplicative constant), we
find the conditional probabilities of interest:
p0|0 = Tr(M0τ0) = a+ 2c+ e ,
p1|1 = Tr(M1τ1) = (1− a) + 2c− d . (87)
The values of (p0|0, p1|1) permitted by the positivity con-
straints Eqs. (83)-(85) are depicted in Fig. 5; we leave the
straightforward derivation of Fig. 5 to the interested reader.
Here we only use Eq. (85) to derive a simple bound on∣∣p0|0 + p1|1 − 1∣∣ (the straight portion of the boundary). We
have:
∣∣p0|0 + p1|1 − 1∣∣=4c+ (e− d)
=
√
3 |β|
∣∣∣∣
√
2
3
√
8c
|β| +
1√
3
(e − d)
|β|
∣∣∣∣ . (88)
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Since β =
√
8c2 + (d− e)2, the last factor in the last line
is of the form | cos θ cosφ + sin θ sinφ| = | cos(θ − φ)| ≤ 1.
Moreover, from Eq. (85), |β| ≤ 12 . Hence,
∣∣p0|0 + p1|1 − 1∣∣ ≤
√
3
2
. (89)
This upper bound for protocols with the P-H property is
tight, in the sense that there exists a simple LOCC proce-
dure that achieves this bound. This procedure is described
in Appendix C.
Equation (89) establishes that τ0,1 cannot be perfectly
distinguished by measurements with PPT POVM elements,
since the perfect measurement would give p0|0 + p1|1 = 2.
We can also put a lower bound on the amount of entan-
glement required to distinguish τ0 from τ1 perfectly. The
combined support of τ0 and τ1 has full rank and τ0 and τ1
are orthogonal; therefore, the perfect POVM measurement
has uniqueM0,1. The measurement, if used as in Fig. 1(b),
can create the states M0/Tr(M0) and M1/Tr(M1). These
both have ≈ 0.55 ebits of entanglement of formation, as
calculated using Ref. [27]. Therefore, τ0,1 take at least 0.55
ebits to distinguish perfectly.
We conjecture that the parity of the number of τ1 in a
tensor product of n τ0s and τ1s cannot be decoded better
than by measuring each tensor component and combining
the results. More precisely, we consider distinguishing the
states
τ
(n)
b =
1
2n−1
∑
b1⊕b2⊕···⊕bn=b
τb1 ⊗ τb2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ τbn . (90)
Here ⊕ is addition modulo two. We follow the general
method to find the allowed values of (p
(n)
0|0 , p
(n)
1|1 ), and con-
sider PPTM0,1 ≥ 0 with the proper symmetries. Since the
eigenvalues ofM0 for n ≥ 2 are not analytically obtainable,
we have performed a numerical maximization of p
(n)
1|1 with
fixed p
(n)
0|0 for n = 2 and n = 3. All numerical results pre-
sented have negligible numerical errors. The allowed region
for (p
(2)
0|0, p
(2)
1|1) is given in Fig. 6. The best value of p
(2)
0|0+p
(2)
1|1
is precisely the one achieved by applying the LOCC mea-
surement in Appendix C on each tensor component, and
classically combining the results to infer the parity. The
same has been confirmed for n = 3: p
(3)
0|0 + p
(3)
1|1 ≤ 1.64952.
While we have no convincing arguments for the conjecture
for general n, the n = 2, 3 cases are unlikely to be degen-
eracies or coincidences.
Suppose the conjecture is true. Let 12 (p
(1)
0|0 + p
(1)
1|1) ≤ p
where p = 12 +
√
3
4 denotes the best decoding probability
for n = 1. Then, τ
(n)
b is distinguished correctly only if an
even number of components are decoded incorrectly, thus
p
(n)
0|0 + p
(n)
1|1 ≤ 2
∑
k even
pn−k(1 − p)k
(
n
k
)
= (p+ (1− p))n + (p− (1− p))n
= 1 + (2p− 1)n
= 1 +
(√3
2
)n
. (91)
The upper bound on p
(n)
0|0 + p
(n)
1|1 − 1 implies
∣∣p(n)0|0 + p(n)1|1 −
1
∣∣ ≤ (√32 )n. If the conjecture is true, this bound vanishes
exponentially with the number of qubits used, and τ
(n)
b
can be used to hide a single bit in a way similar to the Bell
mixtures ρ
(n)
b . Comparing Eqs. (91) and (33), the separable
scheme takes 1
1−log2
√
3
≈ 4.8 times as many qubits as in
the Bell-state protocol to achieve the same level of security.
VIII. Conditionally Secure Quantum Bit
Commitment
Bit commitment [28] is a cryptographic protocol with
two parties, Alice and Bob. It has two stages, the com-
mit and the open phases. The goal is to enable Alice to
commit to a bit that can neither be learned by Bob before
the open phase nor be changed by Alice after the com-
mit phase. Bit commitment is a primitive for many other
protocols, such as coin tossing, cf. Ref. [28]. However,
the security of classical bit commitment schemes relies on
unproved assumptions on computational complexity, while
unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment has been
proved to be impossible [29], [30].
In this section, we use the main idea of the bit hiding
scheme in Section III to construct a conditionally secure
bit commitment scheme in the following setting. The com-
mitment is shared between two recipients (Bob-1 and Bob-
2) who do not share entanglement and can perform only
LOCC. Thus the present discussion contrasts with previous
works in that (1) it is not precisely a two-party protocol
and (2) the security is conditioned on restricting the two
Bobs to LOCC operations only.
Let n, r be security parameters. The scheme is secure in
the sense that the dishonest Bobs learn at most 2−(n−1)
bits on the committed bit before the open phase, and a
dishonest Alice can change her commitment without being
caught with probability 2−r. The scheme is as follows:
• Commit phase: To commit to b = 0 (b = 1), Alice picks a
random |wk〉 with5 an even (odd) number of singlets |w11〉.
Alice sends one qubit of each Bell pair to each Bob.
• Open phase: Alice sends n+r singlets to Bob-1 and Bob-
2, who apply a random hashing test [7], [31] and use r of the
singlets to check if the received states are indeed singlets.
Alice is declared cheating if the test fails. Otherwise, the
remaining n singlets are used to teleport Bob-1’s qubits to
Bob-2 who measures k to find b.
Proof: [Security] If Alice is honest, the security of the
bit hiding scheme implies that the dishonest Bobs can learn
at most O(2−n) bits of information before the open phase.
If Bob is honest, the most general strategy for a dishonest
Alice is to prepare a pure state |ψ〉 with five parts, Pi for
i = 1, · · · , 5. In the commit phase, she gives P1 and P2
to Bob-1 and Bob-2. In the open phase, she applies some
quantum operation E on P3, P4, P5. Then, she sends P3
and P4 to Bob-1 and Bob-2. If P3, P4 are indeed n + r
singlets, the test is passed and E does not change the state
5Recall that |wk〉 denotes a tensor product of n Bell states specified
by the 2n-bit string k according to the scheme in Eq. (5).
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of P1 and P2, and Bob-2 indeed obtains P1, P2 in the same
state as in the commit phase after teleportation. (P1, P2
can only be changed during the teleportation steps when
interacting with P3, P4 if they are not singlets.) In this case,
the distribution of k and therefore the committed bit b in
both phases are the same – Alice cannot change or delay
her commitment. In case P3 and P4 are not singlet states
the analysis of the failure probability of the random hashing
method follows the quantum key distribution security proof
by Lo and Chau [31]. If P3, P4 are in some state orthogonal
to n+r singlets, the test is passed with probability 2−r only.
In general, let α be the fidelity of P3, P4 with respect to
n+ r singlets. The probability to change the commitment
without being caught is ≤ 2−r(1 − α) which is less than
2−r.
Note that our scheme does not force Alice to commit. For
example, she can send an equal superposition of the b = 0, 1
states, but she cannot control the outcome at the opening
phase. However, this is inherent to schemes which conceal
the commitment from Bob. Classically, it is as if Alice sent
an empty locked box with no bit written inside, or a device
in which Bob’s opening the box triggered a fair coin toss
to determine the bit.
We note that the above scheme has many equivalent vari-
ations. For example, Alice may instead prepare a super-
position
∑
k∈En/On |k〉 ⊗ |wk〉 and send the second part
to the Bobs, which provides a way of sending the density
matrices ρ
(n)
b . Bob can request Alice to announce k in the
open phase, and declare her cheating if he finds a different
k. However, these schemes are exactly equivalent to the
proposed one.
IX. Discussion
The quantum data hiding protocol using Bell mixtures
can be demonstrated with existing quantum optics tech-
niques. The hider can prepare any one of the four polariza-
tion Bell states, 1√
2
(| l , l〉± | ↔ ,↔〉), 1√
2
(| l ,↔〉± | l ,↔
〉). Any of these can be prepared using downconversion [32],
followed by an appropriate single photon operation. The
photons can be sent through two different beam paths to
Alice and Bob. Then Alice and Bob might attempt to un-
lock the secret by LOCC operations as in Section III-C; this
requires high efficiency single-photon detection.6 Alterna-
tively, the secret can be completely unlocked if a quantum
channel is opened up for Alice to send her photons to Bob,
who performs an incomplete measurement on each pair to
distinguish the singlet 1√
2
(| l ,↔〉−| l ,↔〉) from the other
three Bell states. Such an incomplete measurement has
been performed in the lab [32]; a full Bell measurement is
not necessary and is in fact not technologically feasible in
current experiments.
Our alternative low-entanglement preparation scheme
would require more sophisticated quantum-optics technolo-
6 The quantum efficiency of detectors strongly depends on the wave-
length. At 543 nm, quantum efficiencies as high as 95% have been
observed (E. Waks et al., unpublished). At 694 nm, quantum effi-
ciencies as high as ≈ 88% were reported, see Ref. [33].
gies than presently exist but is interesting to consider. As
we showed in Section VI, quantum operations in the Clif-
ford group are required. The one-qubit gates are obtainable
by linear optics, but the cnot gate cannot be implemented
perfectly by using linear optical elements. However, recent
work by Knill et al. [34] shows that a cnot gate can be
implemented near-deterministically in linear optics when
single-photon sources are available. So, this preparation
scheme may be practicable in the near future as well.
We have proved for the Bell mixtures ρ
(n)
0,1 that the secret
is hidden against LOCC measurements; but the secret can
be perfectly unlocked by LOCC operations if Alice and Bob
initially share n ebits of entanglement (the LOCC proce-
dure is just quantum teleportation followed by a Bell mea-
surement by Bob). What is the smallest amount of entan-
glement Emin required for perfect unlocking? This quan-
tity would give another interesting measure of the strength
of hiding. We do not know Emin exactly, although we can
give a lower bound for it. The bound is obtained by con-
sidering the procedure of Fig. 1(b) as a state-preparation
protocol. Here we take the measurement M to be the non-
local one that exactly distinguishes the hiding states. This
M is unique because ρ
(n)
0,1 have full combined support and
are orthogonal. Considering M to be an LOCC measure-
ment performed with the assistance of Emin ebits of prior
entanglement, the average output entanglement of forma-
tion of Fig. 1(b) provides a lower bound for Emin, since
the LOCC procedure cannot increase the average entan-
glement.
This entanglement of formation is straightforward to
compute: When the input is two halves of two maximally
entangled states as shown, the input density matrix, which
is proportional to the identity, can be expressed as:
I
4n
=
|En|
4n
ρ
(n)
0 +
|On|
4n
ρ
(n)
1 . (92)
The output state is therefore ρ
(n)
0,1 with probabilities
|En|
4n ,
|On|
4n . Since the entanglement of formation of ρ
(n)
1 is 1 ebit,
the average output entanglement of formation is |On|4n =
1
2 (1−2−n) ebits. Thus, Emin ≥ 12 (1−2−n). This is still far
from the upper bound of n ebits; considering more general
input states in Fig. 1(b) could improve our lower bound.
Our technique of putting bounds on the capabilities of
LOCC operations using the Peres-Horodecki criterion is an
application of the work of Rains [35], [36]. He introduced a
class of quantum operations that contains the LOCC class,
which he called the p.p.t. superoperators [35], [36]; S is in
the p.p.t. class iff (1 ⊗ T ) ◦ S ◦ (1 ⊗ T ) is a completely
positive map. It has been proved7 that the p.p.t. class is
identical to the class of quantum operations that have the
Peres-Horodecki property, which we introduce in Section II.
This p.p.t. class also extends in a very precise way to
the POVMs, in the following sense: the condition that
all Mi be PPT is both a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a POVM to have the P-H property (which is
7
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equivalent to saying that the POVM, viewed as a quan-
tum operation from Hd ⊗ Hd to a one-dimensional space
H1 ⊗ H1, is p.p.t.). The necessary part is proved in Sec-
tion II; sufficiency can be derived by considering an arbi-
trary input ρ to the POVM M including ancillas (as in
Fig. 1(b), but with general input). The output density
matrix for outcome i is proportional to ρi ∝ Trp(Miρ),
where the partial trace is over the input Hilbert space to
M. The partial transpose of this operator can be written
(1⊗ T )[ρi] ∝ Trp[(1⊗ T )[Mi](1⊗ T )[ρ]]; the proof follows
straightforwardly from this formula.
It should be noted that the symmetrizing operation T †
introduced in Section II is not restricted to the p.p.t. class.
For example, T † in Section VII-B is not in the p.p.t. class.
T † only needs to be unital and has the property that T †[M ]
is PPT ifM is PPT. The latter resembles, but is very differ-
ent from the P-H property, which also requires (1⊗T †)[M ]
to be PPT ifM is PPT. The difference is reminiscent of the
distinction between positive and completely positive maps.
We believe that our quantum data hiding scheme using
Bell states can be extended to multiple parties. Consider
for example the extension to three parties Alice, Bob and
Charlie, who are restricted to carrying out LOCC opera-
tions amongst each other. Candidates for the hiding states
are the 3-party extensions of the Werner states, studied by
Eggeling and Werner [37].
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Appendices
A. Bounding the obtainable mutual information
Let X be a binary random variable. Define Zs to be the
set of all binary random variables that satisfy the following
bound on the conditional probabilities:
− δ ≤ p(Z = 0|X = 0) + p(Z = 1|X = 1)− 1 ≤ δ , (93)
as in Eq. (20). Define Ys as the set of all random variables,
with any number of outcomes, for which all “decoding pro-
cesses” D produce binary random variables in the set Zs.
This situation is summarized as
X
M→ Y D→ Z . (94)
Note that p(Z|Y ) prescribed by D may depend on p(Y |X).
In this setting, we have the following bound:
Theorem 2: ∀Y ∈ Ys, I(X : Y ) ≤ δH(X).
Proof: We first derive bounds on the conditional
probability distribution of any Y ∈ Ys given X . We con-
sider p(Z = k|X = l) = ∑j pD(Z = k|Y = j)p(Y = j|X = l)
implied by any Y and D. When we maximize I(X : Y ) over
Y with fixed D, we obtain an overestimate of I(X : Y ) be-
cause we can maximize Y over a superset of Ys. Hence we
can focus on a particular decoding process D defined as:
pD(Z=0|Y =j) = 1 if j ∈ I0 ∪ I− ,
pD(Z=1|Y =j) = 1 if j ∈ I+ , (95)
where
j ∈ I+ ⇔ p(Y =j|X=1) > p(Y =j|X=0) ,
j ∈ I0 ⇔ p(Y =j|X=1) = p(Y =j|X=0) ,
j ∈ I− ⇔ p(Y =j|X=1) < p(Y =j|X=0) . (96)
Given these we can compute
p(Z=0|X=0) + p(Z=1|X=1)
=
∑
j∈I0∪I−
p(Y =j|X=0)+
∑
j∈I+
p(Y =j|X=1)
=
∑
j
max(p(Y =j|X=0), p(Y =j|X=1))
= 1+
∑
j∈I+
p(Y =j|X=1)− p(Y =j|X=0) . (97)
Substituting Eq. (97) into Eq. (93), the first inequality be-
comes trivial and the second inequality gives a necessary
condition on the set Ys:
∀Y ∈ Ys,∑
j∈I+
p(Y =j|X=1)− p(Y =j|X=0) ≤ δ . (98)
We now use Eq. (98) to bound I(X : Y ). We introduce
the notations pj0 = p(Y = j|X=0) and pj1 = p(Y = j|X=
1) for the conditional probabilities, and p(X=0) = x0 and
p(X=1) = x1 = 1− x0 for the fixed prior probabilities for
X . We can then write the mutual information as
I(X : Y ) =
∑
j∈I+∪I− f(pj0, pj1) (99)
where
f(pj0, pj1) =
∑1
α=0 xαpjα log
pjα
x0pj0+x1pj1
(100)
represents the information on X obtained from the out-
come Y =j, weighted by p(Y =j). Note also the outcomes
in I0 do not contribute to the mutual information. We will
maximize Eq. (100) subject to the constraints
∑
j
pj0 = 1 ,
∑
j
pj1 = 1 , (101)
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and ∑
j∈I+
pj1 − pj0 ≤ δ . (102)
The maximization of I(X : Y ) is made tractable by not-
ing that any optimal Y can be replaced by another Y ′′
with |I ′′+|, |I ′′0 |, |I ′′−| ≤ 1, and satisfying the same constraints
Eqs. (101) and (102). We prove this using the fact that
f(p0, p1) = f(~p) is linear (f(c~p) = cf(~p)) and convex, giv-
ing
f(c0 ~p+ c1 ~q) ≤ c0f(~p) + c1f(~q)
= f(c0 ~p) + f(c1 ~q) . (103)
Absorbing the nonnegative factors c0,1 into the probability
vectors, this becomes simply
f(~p+ ~q) ≤ f(~p) + f(~q) . (104)
The convexity of f is proved by showing that the Hes-
sian matrix ∂2f/∂pα∂pβ is positive semidefinite (it is
straightforward to show that its eigenvalues are 0 and
x0x1(p
2
0 + p
2
1)/(p0p1
∑
α xαpα)).
Given any Y , we first construct an intermediate Y ′ as
follows: For each outcome j ∈ Y with unequal conditional
probabilities (pj0, pj1), introduce two outcomes in Y
′ with
conditional probabilities:
(0, pj1 − pj0) and (pj0, pj0) if j ∈ I+
(pj0 − pj1, 0) and (pj1, pj1) if j ∈ I− .
All outcomes in I0 occur in Y
′ unchanged. Note that
the number of outcomes are such that |I ′±| = |I±| and
|I ′0| = |I+| + |I−| + |I0|. The constraints Eqs. (101) and
(102) are satisfied by Y ′ because the quantities involved
are conserved by construction. I(X : Y ′) ≥ I(X : Y )
by applying Eq. (104) to each replacement. Finally, as
all I ′+ outcomes have pj0 = 0, and all I
′
− outcomes have
pj1 = 0, we introduce the desired random variable Y
′′
with just three outcomes, with conditional probabilities
(0,
∑
j∈I′
+
pj1), (
∑
j∈I′
−
pj0, 0), and (
∑
j∈I′0 pj0,
∑
j∈I′0 pj0).
Y ′′ still satisfies Eqs. (101) and (102), and the linearity of
f implies I(X : Y ′′) = I(X : Y ′).
So, we have established that there exists an optimal
Y with conditional probabilities (p10, 0), (0, p21), and
(p30, p30); these may be interpreted as the “certainly 0”,
“certainly 1”, and “don’t know” outcomes. It is now triv-
ial to show that the best choice of these parameters con-
sistent with the constraints is given by p10 = p21 = δ,
p30 = 1− δ. These parameters lead to the mutual informa-
tion I(X : Y ) = δH(X), proving the theorem.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: We write the density matrices ρ0,1 of the hid-
ing states in the Pauli decomposition
ρb =
1
4n
∑
k
abkσk , (105)
where the sum is over all 16n possible 4n-bit strings k, and
σk is identified with a tensor product of 2n Pauli matrices
as defined in Section III. We restrict our choice of LOCC
measurements to those that measure the eigenvalues of a
particular optimal σs, which can be +1 or −1. This mea-
surement is in the LOCC class because it is the product of
the eigenvalues of all the Pauli matrix components, which
can be measured locally and communicated classically to
obtain the final result. If we associate the outcomes +1
and −1 with ρ0 and ρ1 respectively, the POVM elements
are Ms0 =
1
2 (I + σs) and Ms1 =
1
2 (I − σs). Using the fact
abs = Trσsρb , (106)
we can calculate the conditional probabilities of interest:
p(+1| s, ρb) = Tr(Ms0ρb) = 1
2
(1 + abs) ,
p(−1| s, ρb) = Tr(Ms1ρb) = 1
2
(1− abs) . (107)
In this notation, p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 is given by
p(+1| s, ρ0) + p(−1| s, ρ1)− 1 = 1
2
(a0s − a1s) . (108)
If the right-hand side of Eq. (108) is negative, then we can
always do better by inverting the assignment of outcomes,
flipping the sign of this factor. So, we can always achieve
p(+1| s, ρ0) + p(−1| s, ρ1)− 1 = 1
2
|a0s − a1s| . (109)
Our goal is to establish a lower bound on this quantity due
to the orthogonality of ρ0 and ρ1. Thus we consider
min
ρ0,1:ρ0⊥ρ1
max
s
(p0|0 + p1|1 − 1)
= min
ρ0,1:ρ0⊥ρ1
max
s
1
2
|a0s − a1s| . (110)
Let ρ0,1 be fixed, and s
∗, which depends on ρ0,1, be the
corresponding s which maximizes 12 |a0s − a1s|. Let
q0 = max(a0s∗ , a1s∗) , q1 = min(a0s∗ , a1s∗) . (111)
We can rephrase the optimization in Eq. (110) as a mini-
mization over abs for s 6= 0 (ab0 = 1 is fixed by the nor-
malization of ρ0,1), subject to the following constraints:
1. Optimality of s∗:
q0 − q1 = κs|a0s − a1s| where κs ≥ 1 . (112)
2. Orthogonality of ρ0 and ρ1, implying that
∑
s 6=0 a0sa1s =
−1, or ∑
s 6=0,s∗
a0sa1s + q0q1 = −1 . (113)
Note that we do not impose the positivity of ρ0,1, and
obtain a valid, though possibly loose bound. The above
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constraints are imposed by introducing the Lagrange mul-
tipliers λ and λs for s 6= 0, s∗, transforming the problem to
the unconstrained minimization:
min
(
q0 − q1 −
∑
s 6=0,s∗
λs
[
(q0 − q1)− κs|a0s − a1s|
]
−λ
[ ∑
s 6=0,s∗
a0sa1s + q0q1
])
. (114)
We can fix q0 and minimize over q1 and abs for s 6= 0, s∗. If
a0s 6= a1s whenever s 6= 0 (the other case will be discussed
later) this function is analytic and we obtain the minimum
by setting the derivatives of Eq. (114) with respect to the
independent variables q1, a0s, and a1s to zero:
1 + λq0 −
∑
s 6=0,s∗ λs = 0 , (115)
rsκsλs + λa1s = 0 ∀ s 6= 0, s∗ , (116)
−rsκsλs + λa0s = 0 ∀ s 6= 0, s∗ . (117)
Here rs = +1 if a0s > a1s and rs = −1 if a0s < a1s. We
need to solve Eqs. (112), (113), (115), and (117) for q0−q1.
First of all, we eliminate the abs by substituting Eqs. (116)
and (117) into the constraints Eqs. (112) and (113):
λ(q0 − q1) = 2κ2sλs , (118)
−∑s 6=0,s∗ κ2sλ2s + λ2q0q1 = −λ2 . (119)
We can obtain two other equations from Eq. (118):
λ(q0 − q1)
∑
s 6=0,s∗
λs = 2
∑
s 6=0,s∗
κ2sλ
2
s ,
λ(q0 − q1)
∑
s 6=0,s∗
1
κ2s
= 2
∑
s 6=0,s∗
λs . (120)
We now have Eqs. (115), (119), and (120) in four variables∑
s 6=0,s∗ κ
2
sλ
2
s ,
∑
s 6=0,s∗ λs, λ, and q0 − q1. We can per-
form standard eliminations and obtain an expression for
the minimum of q0 − q1:
q0 − q1 = 2
√
(1 + C)q20 + C − q0
C
, (121)
where C =
∑
s 6=0,s∗ 1/κ
2
s.
To reexpress Eq. (121) in the notation of the theorem
statement, we use q0 = 2p0|0− 1 and q1 = 2p1|1 − 1, which
follow from Eqs. (107) and (111). We have
p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 ≥
√
(1 + C)(2p0|0 − 1)2 + C − (2p0|0 − 1)
C
.
(122)
This can be simplified by changing variables y = p0|0+p1|1
and x = p0|0 − p1|1 and solving for y. We obtain
p0|0 + p1|1 − 1 ≥
√
1 + (p0|0 − p1|1)2√
C + 1
. (123)
To achieve the desired lowest minimum in Eq. (110), we
will replace C by its upper bound. Since κs ≥ 1,
C ≤ 16n − 2 , (124)
and we obtain the statement Eq. (37) to be proven.
The analysis for the cases when a0s = a1s for some s
is similar to the one just presented. We obtain values of
q0 − q1 which are always greater than in Eqs. (121) and
(124), so these cases can be excluded.
We remark that the weaker result, Eq. (38), can be
proved without the Lagrange multiplier analysis. When
we maximize over all possible s, the best achievable p0|0 +
p1|1 − 1 is at least, using Eq. (110):
max
s
1
2
|a0s − a1s| ≥ max
s:a0sa1s<0
1
2
|a0s − a1s|
≥ max
s:a0sa1s<0
√
|a0s a1s|
=
√∣∣∣ min
s:a0sa1s<0
a0s a1s
∣∣∣
≥ 1√
16n − 1 . (125)
In the above proof, we use the orthogonality condition∑
s 6=0 a0s a1s = −1, so that {s : a0s a1s < 0} is non-empty
and mins 6=0 a0s a1s ≤ −116n−1 . Equation (125) is indepen-
dent of ρ0,1, thus no further minimization over ρ0 and ρ1
is needed.
C. An optimal LOCC protocol to distinguish τ0
and τ1
In this appendix, we describe and discuss an LOCC pro-
tocol to distinguish τ0 from τ1 that achieves the bound in
Eq. (89). We employ the Bloch representation of a qubit.
We identify the qubit state cos θ |0〉+sin θ |1〉 with the den-
sity matrix 12 [I+sin(2θ)σx+cos(2θ)σz ]. The coefficients of
σx and σz can be conveniently plotted as a 2-dimensional
vector. In this representation, orthogonal vectors are anti-
parallel. The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice first projects her qubit onto one of the two states
η± = 12 [I ± 1√2 (−σx + σz)], and sends the result to Bob.
2. Let cosα = 1√
3
(1 + 1√
2
) and sinα = 1√
3
(1− 1√
2
).
If Alice obtains η+, Bob projects his qubit onto the states
η+± = 12 [I ± (cosασx + sinασz)].
If Alice obtains η−, Bob projects his qubit onto the states
η−± = 12 [I ± (sinασx + cosασz)].
It is straightforward to verify that this protocol achieves
the bound given by Eq. (89).
The intuition behind this protocol is as follows. It actu-
ally distinguishes among the four states |0+〉, |+0〉, |11〉,
|−−〉 with high probability. The first measurement ex-
tracts no information on whether the state is τ0 or τ1.
Rather, it distinguishes {|0+〉, |−−〉} from {|+0〉, |11〉}
with high probability. Then, Bob adaptively measure ap-
proximately along the {|+〉, |−〉} or the {|0〉, |1〉} bases.
Bob’s optimal measurement bases, the states η±±, are
slightly tilted from |+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉 to account for the im-
perfection of the inference from Alice’s outcome. A detailed
pictorial explanation is given in Fig. 7.
The POVM elements of this measurement are given by
M0 = η+⊗η+++η−⊗η−+ andM1 = η+⊗η+−+η−⊗η−−.
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They are not symmetric under the operation discussed in
Section VII-B, T [ρ] = 14 (ρ + sρs + h2ρh2 + sh2ρh2s). For
this particular case, the POVM defined by T [M0], T [M1]
is also LOCC – Alice and Bob flip two fair coins, which
determine if they are either to carry out the original proto-
col, or to exchange their roles, or to carry out the protocol
in the conjugate basis, or to do both. Note that T is not
an LOCC operation, yet it always transforms one LOCC
POVM to another. This example also illustrates that such
symmetrizing operations on the POVM elements, though
they originate from symmetries of the states, do not corre-
spond to actual operations on the state. We do not know
if the class of LOCC POVMs is preserved under all com-
pletely positive operations T such that T †[ρ] is PPT if ρ is
PPT; in fact, we do not even know if this class is preserved
under LOCC operations.
Concerning the general question of whether PPT pre-
serving POVMs are achievable by LOCC, very little is
presently known. However, we have been able to prove
that, in H2 ⊗ H2, PPT preserving POVM measurements
with two orthogonal POVM elements are always in the
LOCC class. Applying this result to the τ0,1 measurement,
we obtain values of (p
(1)
0|0, p
(1)
1|1) that we know to be achiev-
able by LOCC, plotted in Fig. 8.
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(a) A bipartite POVM measurement with two outcomes. (b)
Applying the bipartite POVM measurement to two halves of
two maximally entangled states |Ψmax〉 results in a residual
state which is proportional to the transpose of the POVM
element corresponding to the measurement outcome.
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Equation (19) restricts (p0|0, p1|1) to the above shaded
region. The points B, C, and D are respectively ( 2
−(n−1)
1+2−n
, 1),
( 1−2
−n
1+2−n
, 0), and ( 1
2
2n+2
2n+1
, 1
2
2n
2n−1
). The point D is achievable by
a LOCC measurement described in Section III-C. The
expression p0|0 + p1|1 is maximized at B.
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Fig. 3
For any pair of orthogonal states ρ0,1 on H2n ⊗H2n , there
exists an LOCC POVM with probabilities p0|0, p1|1 above the
curves shown for n = 1 and n = 2. The dashed lines are the
simpler, weaker bound of Eq. (38).
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Contours of constant upper bound on log I(B : Y ), Eq. (61),
while varying n (the vertical axis) and k (the horizontal
axis). The bound on log I(B : Y ) is calculated using the
expression for ∆ in Eq. (56) with Lp in Eq. (52).
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Fig. 7
A protocol to distinguish |0+〉, |+0〉, |11〉, |−−〉, labeled by ©1 ,
©2 , ©3 , ©4 . The classically correlated initial states of Alice
and Bob are plotted in the two left diagrams. We will
illustrate the case of equal prior probabilities, indicated by
the equal lengths of the four state vectors. Alice projects
her qubit onto η±, which distinguishes |0+〉, |−−〉 (©1 and ©4 )
from |+0〉, |11〉 (©2 and ©3 ) with high probability. The two
right diagrams represent the qubit state of Bob conditioned
on the two measurement outcomes of Alice. The conditional
probabilities of the states are represented by their lengths.
The optimal measurements of Bob to distinguish τ0 from τ1
are given by the projections along η±±. In fact, conditioned
on η+, η++ is the projector along the direction of vector
sum of ©1 and ©2 , and similarly η++ is the projector along
the direction of vector sum of ©3 and ©4 , which explains the
optimality. Similar reasoning applies for η−±. Bob infers τ0
from measuring η±+, and τ1 from measuring η±−.
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The inner curve bounds the region of (p
(1)
0|0
, p
(1)
1|1
) attained by
LOCC measurement on states τ0,1, and the outer curve
bounds the region attained by PPT-preserving measurements
(from Fig. 5).
